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A K A P PAN SPECIAL SECTION ON SCHOOL REFORM

The District Role in Instructional
Improvement
Are changing conditions affecting the capacity of
districts to provide focus, to coordinate support, and to
scale up successful reforms? From a study of the roles
played by central office staff members in shaping and
supporting instructional reforms in three large urban
districts, the authors derive an answer.
BY TOM CORCORAN, SUSAN H. FUHRMAN, AND CATHERINE L. BELCHER

ECENT literature on school improvement has stressed the
important role that districts can play in improving instruction
by providing vision, focus, support, and policy coordination
and by building commitment at the school level.1 However,
large school districts have always had difficulty carrying out
these tasks and persisting with a reform focus long enough to see
results. Changes in leadership, new state policies, and changes
in funding have been major impediments. Some critics have
even argued that districts are inherently incapable of stimulating and sustaining meaningful reforms in teaching and learning because of their political
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and bureaucratic character.2
While the successful implementation of instructional reforms in locations as diverse as District 2 in
New York City; Union City, New Jersey; Cincinnati,
Ohio; El Paso, Texas; and Long Beach, California, argues against this harsh conclusion, the current policy
environment certainly makes this work more difficult.
Many large urban districts are attempting to carry out
these functions in environments characterized by decentralized decision making, high-stakes accountability, and increasing competition among providers of
comprehensive school reform designs and other “research-based” instructional improvement strategies.
Are these changing conditions affecting the capacity of districts to provide focus, to coordinate support,
and to scale up successful reforms? The Consortium
for Policy Research in Education (CPRE) examined the
roles played by central office staff members in shaping
and supporting instructional reforms in three large urban districts. In this article, the three districts have
been given the pseudonyms of Metropolis, River City,
and Sun City. They are located in three different states,
and their enrollments range from 50,000 students to
more than 200,000.
THE FINDINGS

Our findings are presented below in three broad
categories, representing the major strategic decisions
that face any organization seeking to improve its performance. Deciding what to do — the problem of design and adoption — is the first of these tasks. The
second is determining how to get it done — the problem of support and coordination. The organization
needs to focus people’s attention on the desired changes, ensure effective implementation, reduce distractions,
and buffer the work from competing agendas. Finally, there is the task of scaling up the reforms if they
are successful — the problem of replication. While
these categories overlap, they are useful organizers for
the presentation of our findings.
DESIGN AND ADOPTION

Central office staff members in the three districts
were struggling to define their roles. They wanted
schools to make decisions about improvement strate-

gies and professional development, but they also wanted them to adopt best practices. However, they were
uncertain about who should determine what was best
and on what basis such determinations should be
made. Should schools be left to figure it out for themselves, or should the central office point them in the
right direction and limit their options? Should the role
of the central office be limited to providing schools
with good information about specific programs and
designs, including what the research evidence shows?
District staff members agonized over these and related questions. Making a shift to evidence-based practice proved to be difficult in all three jurisdictions.
River City set up a screening process that examined
the alignment between local standards and various wholeschool designs with externally developed curricula and
then reviewed the evidence supporting the claims of
the developers. Schools were permitted to choose only those designs that had been approved by the districtwide committee. This initially limited the schools
to four whole-school designs. The options were slowly expanded in subsequent years, but the committee
became more demanding and ruled out designs that
could not present strong evidence of positive effects.
There were few objections to this process from the
schools. In fact, school staffs indicated that they appreciated the effort by the central office to rule out
programs that might prove ineffective.
Metropolis wanted to provide schools with summaries of the research evidence on various designs and
programs so that they could make more informed choices. However, the project was delayed for two years as
central office staff members debated which programs
and what information should be included. These debates were largely ideological; there were objections to
including some programs on philosophical grounds
and objections to the presentation of evidence when
it did not correspond to the preferences of staff members.
Sun City established a committee, including members from higher education institutions, to screen reforms being considered by the district. However, its
members were unwilling to take on the screening function because they viewed it as being too prescriptive.
In the end, in all three districts, philosophical commitments and political necessities often prevailed over
evidence. One district mandated the creation of small-

er units in all its schools as a result of the strongly held
philosophical views of some influential members of
the central staff, ignoring evidence that these units
were generating a new tracking system that resulted
in unequal access to high-quality teachers and curricula. Another aggressively promoted charters and school
restructuring while neglecting its investment in wholeschool reform. And the third permitted an external
funding agency to promote poorly defined school partnerships as an improvement strategy even though none
of the district leaders believed that the strategy would
produce significant gains and there was no evidence
offered to support it. These were merely some of the
examples of how the emergence of evidence-based decision making was hampered by whims, fads, opportunism, and ideology.
Each of the three districts also designed its own significant reforms that were intended to be widely, if
not universally, adopted by its schools. However, the
districts’ use of research evidence in the design process
varied. The champions of specific reforms typically examined literature selectively and found theories and
“evidence” to justify their approaches, or they recruited “experts” who were advocates of the preferred
strategy. The distinctions between empirical research,
theories, and simple advocacy were not well understood and certainly had little effect on the decisionmaking process.
Metropolis sought to break up its large schools by
first encouraging and then mandating the creation of
small learning communities. District guidelines were
issued about the size, organization, and function of
these communities. River City addressed the same set
of problems by issuing an invitation to schools to engage in a highly specified restructuring program and
offering incentives for their participation. However,
the invitation was viewed as a mandate by the schools,
since it described a three-year rollout of the program.
Nevertheless, the schools’ response was less than enthusiastic, and district officials had to “recruit” participants. Only about half of the schools were involved
in the project at the end of the three years. As the leadership’s attention was drawn to other initiatives, the
rollout slowed, and in the fourth year only a handful
of new schools adopted the reform.
Sun City required low-performing schools to adopt
a home-grown comprehensive school design. After three

years, the original sites had made significant achievement gains. The district published and disseminated
evidence about the program’s impact but was unable
to recruit additional adopters because the design was
viewed as “remedial” and suitable only for schools serving concentrations of low-income students. The district made no effort to “sell” the program to the schools
that might benefit from it, nor did it strengthen the
incentives.
There was significant investment in evaluations of
these local initiatives. All three districts used the results of evaluations to make revisions in their programs. Sometimes the evaluations affected their decisions about continuing or expanding their investments in these programs. The district staff members
seemed to be more demanding about evidence of effects from locally developed initiatives than from externally developed ones. Although they sometimes promoted local initiatives at design fairs and other events
in the absence of any positive evidence, they did not
make major resource commitments to such programs
if they had negative evidence. The difference in the
attitudes toward locally and externally developed programs may be related to the facts that the latter often
brought external funds with them and that they were
legitimated by their national reputations.
Commitment to the use of evidence and efforts to
use evidence were much stronger in the central offices
in all three sites than they were among school staffs. District staff members generally felt that decisions ought
to be based on a solid rationale supported by or at least
consistent with research. However, the efforts of district staff members to use research evidence were frequently frustrated by the lack of research on key issues (e.g., the effectiveness of middle schools, high
school literacy programs, coaching strategies), the lack
of readily available syntheses, and the persistence of
contradictory findings. District staff members also reported that it was often hard to obtain the most recent studies and harder still to assess the claims made
by various program developers.
In contrast, school staff members paid lip service
to the use of research but in fact expressed more confidence in recommendations from other teachers than
in research. They found research hard to access and
even harder to interpret, and they were ill prepared to
sort out significant findings from other knowledge

claims.
So the decentralization of decision making combined with weak district guidance appeared to be undermining the use of knowledge rather than promoting it. Selection of whole-school reforms by school
staffs was often based more on personal testimonials,
philosophical comfort, ease of use, lack of threat to
current practice, and good marketing by developers
than it was on evidence of effects.
Teachers heartily endorsed the practice
of visiting other schools that were using a design before selecting it, and they
indicated that research was less useful
for determining if a design was producing results than for determining
whether the design fit their own notions of good practice. In other words,
in choosing a research-based design, teachers were
more interested in designs that drew on research about
practices that they already felt were “good” than in designs that were producing results.
In summary, when educators selected designs, they
were definitely interested in effectiveness. However,
they defined effectiveness in a manner that might encompass, but certainly moved beyond, student assessment results. Teachers were more interested in how
the design incorporated what they knew about good
practice — as defined by the craft knowledge of
“good” teachers and their own philosophical orientation. Ideally this judgment was consistent with research, but when it was not, experience and ideology
often prevailed. Teachers were most persuaded when
they received direct endorsements from other teachers.
The pressure to do “something” and to raise scores
also made it difficult to proceed deliberately. Under
conditions of uncertainty, the rational course would
be to select the best option or options or to draw on
the available evidence to design an intervention and
then to pilot the program, monitor its effects, and make
revisions. All of this would be done before encouraging widespread adoption. This process takes considerable time. It often takes three to five years to see any
impact on student performance. Leaders in the three
districts did not feel that they had that kind of time.
They were expected to raise performance quickly, and
they were expected to know what to do.

While the time frame for making improvements
was an issue in all three districts, they still invested in
initiatives that were long-term in character. They tried
to protect these programs in order to give them time
to pay off. However, this was often difficult. In all three
districts, within four years of launching the reforms,
the superintendents who had led the design of the initiatives left under pressure from their boards and lo-

The decentralization of decision making

appeared to be undermining the use of
knowledge rather than promoting it.
cal political leaders. In two cases, they were pushed
out even though their initiatives had produced significant growth in student achievement. That was not
deemed sufficient. The reasons that the leaders were
pushed out varied, but in each case, they had offended significant interest groups or political leaders. Even
though two of the three boards made public commitments to continue the reforms and to seek new leaders who would sustain the work, transitions in leadership brought new agendas and a weakening in the
resolve to implement the earlier programs.
COORDINATION AND SUPPORT OF REFORM

All three districts had developed highly elaborate
systems that were intended to provide stable sources
of high-quality professional development for teachers.
They were in place at the beginning of the study and,
with minor modifications, remained in place five years
later. In River City, a central staff development academy had been created. Most of the district’s funding
for professional development went to this academy.
The academy provided short courses for teachers, which
were determined by central office and academy staff
members and represented their vision of the core
knowledge that their teachers needed. The courses focused on generic teaching competencies. The academy also provided training in support of the district’s
reform initiatives, but it did not provide support for
comprehensive school reform. The latter task was left

to the program developers. Nor did the academy provide much follow-up support for its courses. This responsibility was left to school staff members, who had
few discretionary resources for professional development.
In Sun City, the central office had a small staff of
trainers who annually developed a large menu of workshops and courses in cooperation with the schools and
local universities. Their goal was to meet the needs of
the schools and to make their offerings attractive enough
to recruit large numbers of teachers. High participation rates and high levels of teacher satisfaction were
used to justify the funding of the staff development.
Teachers could enroll in these courses with the permission of their administrators. The menu included
some activities directly related to district reforms, especially work on standards-based instruction in the
various disciplines, but it also included a wide variety
of other topics. K-12 clusters of schools also had some
professional development funds and offered training
that focused on common concerns and improvement
efforts. Most of the individual schools likewise had
funds for professional development.
Metropolis developed a large network of full-time
professional development specialists who were expected to provide services to K-12 clusters of schools. These
staff developers ran workshops and did coaching for
teachers in support of the district reforms. Although
the network was intended to be a resource for the schools
and responsive to their needs, its members were most
frequently deployed in support of district and cluster
initiatives. For the most part, they had no connection
to the comprehensive school design teams that were
working with the schools. The schools had few discretionary resources for professional development.
Empirical research had little to do with the professional development offerings in the three districts. Although the infrastructures for professional development differed considerably, they had several things in
common. First, the staff members who led professional development were not members of an evidencebased culture themselves. And district leaders seldom
asked whether participation in the activities that the
trainers and consultants planned and conducted led
to changes in practice or improvements in student performance. None of the three districts monitored professional development activities carefully, nor did they

collect any information on how teachers used the experiences or what impact they had on practice.
Second, the professional development staff members felt that their effectiveness would be judged by
whether they could attract and please teachers, so when
they had discretion over what to offer, they tended to
focus on the hot topics of the day.
Third, they tended to be generalists whose special
skills were group management and putting together
presentations. They saw themselves as trainers. In most
instances, they did not have special expertise in substantive areas, and they typically did not have strong
links to the research community. So professional development was driven by self-defined needs and interests, not by evidence of effectiveness.
All three districts reported problems with focusing
and coordinating their development initiatives. One
source of these problems was philosophical. The district professional development staffs believed that they
should be responsive to the needs of the schools and
therefore wanted to offer multiple forms of training
rather than to focus on a few priorities. They did what
they knew how to do best, which was to repackage
techniques and procedures promoted in the professional development community into workshops for
their teachers.
There were several other reasons why the districts
had trouble coordinating professional development
and aligning it with core initiatives. One reason was
that the districts themselves were not focused. They
were supporting multiple initiatives simultaneously,
and they expected the professional development infrastructure to support all of them. They used professional development as their primary means of communicating with school staffs, so much of the energy
went into awareness sessions designed to inform people rather than to prepare them to implement something or to behave differently.
A second reason for the lack of focus and coordination was that the districts had developed professional development cultures that were not grounded
in
evidence
and
were
committed
to meeting the wants, desires, and needs of teachers.
Once these systems were in place, it was hard to focus
them. The staff development personnel themselves
had to be persuaded that the new initiatives made sense.
A third reason was that most of the professional devel-

opment decisions were being made at levels below the
central office.
District- and school-sponsored professional development activities generally neglected the content knowledge of teachers. The professional development activities
were not discipline-based and tended to emphasize
process and procedure over curriculum and subjectmatter knowledge. The staff members carrying out
this work were not linked to the same reform networks
as the central office staff, and they valued different approaches to instructional improvement. For example,
they played almost no role in whole-school reform in
two of the districts and only a minor role in the third.
The net result of these preferences and beliefs was a
potpourri of workshops and events rather than a coherent program of professional development.
This situation began to change in the last two years
of the study in two of the sites. The districts shifted
their investments into content institutes for teachers
that were based on the curriculum to be taught. But
these shifts had not yet altered the primary delivery
systems in the districts.

signs did not seem to be basing their decisions on evidence of positive effects. Moreover, the accountability programs placed a premium on obtaining quick effects, which are not a hallmark of programs intended
to achieve significant changes in classroom practice.
The noisy reform environment, changes in state policies, and particularly turnover in leadership made it
difficult for the districts to persist with or scale up reforms. In addition to changes in superintendents, all
three districts experienced significant turnover among
the middle-level staff members who actually reviewed
evidence and championed programs.
District leaders wanted to make decisions about
scaling up reform on the basis of evidence. They often could not do this because they felt pressure to display confidence in their vision and to move the reforms forward even when they lacked such evidence.
When the districts did invest in evaluations, the feedback about effects often came too late. District policy makers could not wait for years to decide whether
to aggressively push a reform. They were under pressure to act, and they often merely planned for replication.

REPLICATION OF REFORMS (SCALING UP)

All three districts lacked well-accepted processes for
deciding what to scale up, they seldom considered how
teachers viewed the costs and benefits of new programs, and they rarely developed comprehensive marketing campaigns to persuade staff members to adopt
new practices. The tendencies were either to offer opportunities to schools or to mandate reforms and provide training. Little thought was given to incentives
and disincentives, to possible barriers to implementation, or to the legitimacy of alternatives.
Many central office staff members believed that highstakes accountability systems, with their pressure to
improve performance, would lead to the adoption of
“proven” practices and that over time school staffs
would make better adoption decisions. There is some
evidence to support this assumption. Literacy programs
spread rapidly across two of the districts because early
adopters achieved higher gains on reading tests than
other schools. But there is also some contrary evidence.
Schools continued to participate in some whole-school
designs even though they had not experienced gains
after several years. New adopters in whole-school de-

CONCLUSIONS

Leaders in all three districts claimed that they wanted staff members to base their decisions on evidence
whenever possible and that they wanted to support
and spread programs and practices that produced results. In all three instances, there were serious efforts
to build evidence-based cultures in the central office
and to encourage schools to pay attention to research
evidence. However, these efforts were hampered by
the inadequacy of the research evidence and by difficulties accessing and making sense of it. Conflicting
research findings and the lack of attention to key issues facing districts were also problems. In addition,
district and school staff members were reluctant to put
aside old patterns of decision making that focused on
philosophy or on the “goodness” of an option rather
than on its effects. Nevertheless, some progress was
made in getting central office staff members to consider evidence in making decisions. There was much
less progress, however, in shifting mindsets among school
staff members and, most important, among members
of professional development staffs.

The leaders in the three districts agreed that most
investment decisions were not being made based on
the evidence and viewed this as a significant weakness,
but they also felt that correcting it would require major cultural changes in their organizations. They all
felt they had put “evidence” on the table and that it
had become part of the decision-making process, but
the difficulties in assembling persuasive and timely evidence prevented it from being the central focus in debates over what to do and where to invest.
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